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Comment:
Efficiency of ITQs in the




Professor Danielsson (2000) argues that congestion externalities are solved if indi-
vidual transferable quotas (ITQs) are introduced. This is in direct contrast to my
own research (Boyce 1992; Corollary 1, p. 399). Danielsson raises an interesting
question about how congestion externalities should be modeled. However, I argue
that my own result is fundamentally correct, based on the assumptions I made. Fur-
thermore, my paper defines congestion externalities in a manner that is consistent
with the literature, while Danielsson does not. In addition, the manner in which
Danielsson specifies congestion externalities is indistinguishable from a pecuniary
externality—thus, it is hardly surprising that he finds that ITQs simultaneously
solve both the congestion and common property externality problems.
On The Form of Congestion Externalities in a Fishery
When I think of congestion externalities, I usually have in mind something like that
which occurs in the salmon fishery in Bristol Bay, Alaska.1 In the Dillingham sec-
tion of that fishery, the Alaska Department of Fish and Game prohibits fishing fur-
ther out than one mile from the mouth of the Naknek River. The fishing openings
typically occur when the tide is running in, since the fish have evolved to take ad-
vantage of this push up the river. This means that the fishermen, who use driftnets,
line up on the imaginary line one mile out. As the bay is not wide enough to fit all of
the fishermen simultaneously on the line, some fishermen wait in a queue while oth-
ers fish, since to set one’s net behind the front line is less productive. However,
since the tide is running in, a fisherman who sets his net on the line is immediately
pushed off the line by the tide. I once observed a six-meter long pole with a “Y” at
one end on a boat I visited. The captain told me that the pole was used to push the
net of the fisherman on the front line down into the water as the captain passed his
boat over the front line fisherman’s net with his propeller. The amount of time a boat
spends on the front line is roughly equivalent to the amount of time it takes before
the tide washes the boat in enough so that another boat can fit in front of him. This
is wasteful, since it is optimal to not have idle boats waiting to jump into the queue,
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1 ITQs are not used in this fishery. The example is provided only to illustrate the nature of the conges-
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and since a fisherman does not get to keep his net in the water until it is full.
The essential feature of this queuing example is that the length of the queue de-
pends upon how many boats are on the water (and on technical features, such as
how fast the tide is moving and how wide the bay is). The number of boats on the
water is an input measure, not an output measure. It was in terms of inputs that I
modeled congestion externalities. This is in keeping with the literature.2 However,
Danielsson models congestion in terms of outputs, not inputs. His only defense of
this is to say “it seems likely that production externalities, in the form of crowding,
can be modeled realistically by assuming that it is the sum of the activities of other
firms that matters” (2000, pp. 37–38). In equation (1), Danielsson makes it clear that
the “activities of other firms” refers to the other firm’s output.
Let me provide another example that shows why it is that inputs, not outputs,
are the correct way to model congestion externalities. Consider the case of road con-
gestion. The way in which economists have specified road congestion is to say that
as the number of cars on the road increases (i.e., as the inputs increase), the average
speed (i.e., the output) of each car decreases.3 In Danielsson’s specification, where it
is the outputs that create the congestion costs, one would conclude that the speed of
car i decreases as the speed of the other cars increases.
If inputs are the correct measure, one can specify the production function for
fisherman i as:
hi = f(xi, x–i), (1)
where x–i ≡   xj ji
N
≠ ∑ . Here, the congestion externality occurs because the production
function is assumed to have the property that f2 < 0.4 In addition, f1 > 0 and f11 < 0 is
also assumed. If this is the case, then the cost of producing output equal to hi equals:
ci ≡  minx wxi  subject to  f(xi, x–i) ≥  hi. (2)
Let µ  be the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the binding harvest constraint.
This problem has necessary conditions:
2 Smith (1968, p. 413) defines a “crowding externality” to occur when an individual fisherman’s costs
(which he does not obtain from a production function) are increasing at the aggregate capital level. This
is an input definition, not an output definition. Smith (1969, p. 181) uses a similar definition, “crowding
externalities occur if the fish population is sufficiently concentrated to cause vessel congestion over the
fishing grounds and, thus, increased vessel operating costs for any given catch.” Brown (1974, p. 165)
also defines congestion externalities as arising from inputs “defined in terms of boats in the case of the
fishery, number and location of wells in the instance of groundwater, and hunters in the case of water-
fowl.” Clark (1980, p. 1126) defines an externality in terms of inputs; the cost to the ith fisherman in-
creases as the “effort” of the other j fisherman increases. Karpoff (1987, pp. 184–85) defines the crowd-
ing externality in terms of an individual production function that is decreasing in the number of vessels.
See also McConnell (1977).
3 See Walters (1987) for a review of congestion externalities in the non-fisheries literature. Briefly, Dupuit
(1844) was the first to discuss congestion. Pigou (1912) interpreted the waste due to congestion in roads as a
metaphor for perfect competition, thus concluding that perfect competition is wasteful. Knight (1924) was
the first to point out that private ownership of roads would not result in the congestion externality problem
identified by Pigou, since private owners would have an incentive to charge users a competitive price for ac-
cess to the road. Gordon (1954) was essentially applying Knight’s road congestion model to a fishery.
Danielsson’s claim is, in spirit, similar to Knight’s. However, the difference between the simple road con-
gestion problem and congestion in a fishery is that in a fishery more variables are endogenous. In the sim-
plest road congestion problem (homogeneous cars each traveling the same distance), the only issue is the number
of cars on the road. In a fishery, the endogenous variables include the number of fishermen, the amount of
inputs used by each fisherman, and the length of the season. If there were two types of vehicles, say passen-
ger cars and semi-trucks, a single price is not sufficient to resolve the congestion externalities problem.
4 Throughout, I use the notation that f1 ≡  ∂ f(xi, x–i)/∂ xi, and f2 ≡  ∂ f(xi, x–i)/∂ x–i, where the subscript refers
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w – µ f1(xi, x–i) = 0, and hi – f(xi, x–i) = 0. (3)
The interpretation of µ  is that it is the marginal cost of the constraint that the harvest
equals hi. This model has three parameters: hi, w, and x–i. Thus, the solution to equa-
tion (2) in  xi
* and µ * are each functions of hi, w, and x–i, and the cost function ci
*(hi,
x–i, w) = wxi
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Thus, the cost function ci
*(hi, x–i, w) is increasing in each of its arguments. Notice,
however, that its arguments include the firm’s own output, but not the output of
other firms. The other firms affect firm i’s costs by the quantity of their inputs x–i,
not by the quantity of their outputs. One might think that this can be inverted using
a duality relationship to obtain a cost function that contains the output of the other
fishermen as an argument. I show in the next section that the form of this cost func-
tion cannot be as Danielsson specifies his cost function.
To summarize, the production relationship I specified yields a cost function that
has observable properties, all derived from the underlying production function.6
Danielsson has not derived the production function relationship that generates the
cost function he used. Thus, we have no check on whether or not his definition of a
production externality makes sense.
The Efficiency of ITQs in the Presence of Congestion Externalities
The Efficiency of ITQs When the Congestion Externality is of the Form hi = f(xi, x–i)
I now show, using a simplified version (which ignores the stock externalities) of the
model from my original paper (1992, pp. 393–6), that the result I obtained in that
paper is correct: ITQs do not solve the congestion externality problem.7 In particu-
lar, I shall assume that there are three endogenous variables: the input used by each
identical fisherman, xi; the number of fishermen, N; and the length of time it takes
these fishermen to harvest the entire season quota, T.8 Danielsson, in contrast, as-
sumes that only the harvest levels of each fisherman are endogenous.9 Most fisheries
economists seem to believe that there are multiple margins at which rents are dissi-
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6 This cost function is consistent with the literature. See note 2, supra.
7 The model used in my (1992) paper is more complicated because I was attempting to simultaneously
analyze congestion and stock externalities.
8 These are the same three variables that were endogenous in my original paper. It is possible to derive
the same qualitative results for a model in which the season length is not included. In that case, harvest,
h, is the season harvest, where in the specification in the text, the season harvest by fisherman, i, is Thi.
The issue, however, is that more than one variable is endogenous in a fishery. If only the number of fish-
ermen were the issue, then ITQs would solve both the congestion and common property externalities.
However, when more than one variable is endogenous, this is not the case.
9 I show below that this is not what causes the difference between our results. However, whenever there
is only one cause of both the common property and congestion externalities, only one instrument is
needed to solve both problems.Boyce 236
pated (e.g., Wilen 1979; Townsend 1990). Thus, I stand behind my assumption that
there are multiple endogenous variables.
Let the single season profit function for an individual fisherman be specified as:
π i = T[pf(xi, x–i) – wxi] – ki, (5)
where p is the exogenously determined output price, and ki is a fixed-but-avoidable
cost of entry. In what follows, I shall assume that all fishermen are identical, so ki =
k and fi = f for all i.
The social planner’s problem is to choose T, {x1, x2,…, xN}, and N to maximize:
V j j
N = = ∑ π 1 . (6)
subject to an aggregate harvest constraint:
QT h j j
N ≥ = ∑ 1 . (7)
where Q is the total allowable catch for the season, and a constraint on the season
length that:
TT ≤ . (8)
Let the Lagrange multipliers be λ  and τ , respectively. The first-order necessary con-
ditions include:
(p – λ )[f1 + (N – 1)f2] = w,
T{(p – λ )[f + (N – 1)f2x] – wx} = k, (9)
N[(p – λ )f – wx] = τ   ≥   0.
In the event that T < T , τ  = 0. But this implies T(p – λ )(N – 1)f2x = k, which cannot
hold since f2 < 0. Therefore, the social optimum is characterized by the following:

















Notice that the social planner’s solution explicitly accounts for the congestion exter-
nality in that the f2 term appears in equation (10).
Under ITQs, suppose each fisherman is given an initial quota of q0 = Q/N0,
where N0 is the initial number of fishermen (say under open access). Let zi be the
quantity of quotas fisherman i purchases during the season, and let m be the (annual
rental) quota price, which each fisherman takes as exogenous. Then, an individual
fisherman chooses xi, zi, and Ti to maximize:
π i = Ti[pf(xi, x–i) – wxi] – mzi – ki (11)
subject to the season length constraint in equation (8) and the constraint that he har-
vests no more than the quantity of quotas he owns:Comment:  ITQs and Externalities 237
q0 + zi ≥  Tifi(xi, x–i). (12)
Assume Nash behavior by all individuals and that each individual acts as a price-
taker in the input, output, and quota markets. Let τ i and λ i be the corresponding
Lagrange multipliers. The necessary conditions include:
λ i = m,
(p – m)f1 = w, (13)
(p – m)f – wxi = τ i ≥   0.
In addition, fishermen must earn profits at least equal to the profits they could ob-
tain if they simply sold their quotas. In light of equation (12), and assuming perfect
mobility of resources, this implies:
T[(p – m)f(xi, x–i) – wxi] – ki = 0. (14)
These may be rearranged to show that the symmetric ITQ equilibrium includes:













While ITQs do utilize the full season length, which is socially optimal, they do not
allocate effort optimally, since the third expression differs from the corresponding
expression in equation (10). In particular, the difference is that under ITQs, the con-
gestion externality [the f2 term in the third equation of (10)] does not appear in equa-
tion (15). Therefore, ITQs do not solve the congestion externality problem when the
externality problem is cast in the manner assumed in this model. Thus, my original
result is affirmed (Boyce 1992).
It is interesting to note that when there are no congestion externalities (so f2 = 0),
the market equilibrium quota price equals λ , the social value of a quota, and ITQs
do exactly what they are intended to do—create incentives to maximize rents to the
fishery. When there are congestion externalities (f2 < 0), it is no longer sufficient for
the quota price to equal the social value of a quota; fishermen still ignore the con-
gestion cost they impose on other fishermen under ITQs.
We can get some further intuition about this result by considering the case
where N is fixed and T is ignored, so that hi is the season harvest (rather than the
rate of harvest per unit time). In this case, the profit function for an individual fish-
erman is:
π i = pf(xi, x–i) – wxi – ki. (16)
Here, there is only a single choice: the harvest level of each fisherman, xi. The social
planner would choose xi to maximize the sum of the profits subject to the constraint
in equation (7), rewritten as Q =  hj j
N
= ∑ 1 . The social planner thus chooses the input
levels to satisfy:
(p – λ )f1 – w + (N – 1)(p – λ )f2 = 0. (17)
With ITQs, the profit function in equation (16) becomes:
π i = pf(xi, x–i) – wxi – mzi – ki, (18)Boyce 238
with the constraint that the harvest by fisherman i is less than or equal to the quotas
purchased by i plus i’s initial allocation of quotas:
zi + q0 ≥  f(xi, x–i). (19)
Thus, the ITQ equilibrium is:
λ i – m =  0, and (p – m)f1 – w = 0. (20)
Therefore, for m chosen such that m* = λ  – (p – λ )(N – 1)f2/f1, the pair of externalities is
resolved by ITQs. This suggests that if there is one variable causing both externali-
ties, a single instrument (ITQs) is sufficient to resolve the externality problem.
However, if we add one even more endogenous variable (say N), ITQs will no
longer solve both the common property and congestion externality problems. Sup-
pose, for example, that N is endogenous. Then, the social planner chooses N such
that:
 (p – λ )[f + (N – 1)f2] – wzi – ki = 0. (21)
Under ITQs, with free entry and exiting, the number of fishermen will satisfy:
(p – m)f – wzi – ki = 0. (22)
Now, plug in the quota price, m* = λ  – (p – λ )(N – 1)f2/f1, and the zero-profits condi-
tion under ITQs becomes:
(p – λ )[f + (N – 1)f2f/f1] – wzi – ki = 0. (23)
Thus, when there are two endogenous variables and two externalities, the single in-
strument of ITQs is not capable of simultaneously solving both externalities.
From this discussion, one might conclude that the problem with Danielsson’s
analysis is that he specified his model with only one endogenous variable (the har-
vest rate). However, this is not what yields his result, as the next section shows.
The Efficiency of ITQs When the Congestion Externality is of the Form
ci = c(hi, h–j)
Now, let us assume that the profits to a fisherman are of the form assumed by
Danielsson, i.e.:10
π i = T[phi – c(hi, h–i)] – ki, (24)
where c1 > 0 and c11 > 0. The congestion externality occurs because c2 > 0. The so-
cial planner’s problem is to maximize equation (6) with profits now specified as in
equation (24) subject to the constraints of equations (7) and (8). Again, letting λ  and
10 Danielsson uses an infinite time horizon model and makes the curious statement that, “the choice of a
model, however is of no importance for the arguments in this paper” (2000, p. 38). I prefer to use the in-
season model presented here to talk about ITQs, because no ITQ program allows fishermen to choose
the harvest quota, Q, in a particular year. The results of the previous section show clearly that it does
matter what the choice of the model is.Comment:  ITQs and Externalities 239
τ  denote the Lagrange multipliers for these constraints, the necessary conditions in-
clude:
p – λ   =  c1 + (N – 1)c2,
T[(p – λ )h – c – (N – 1)c2h] = k, (25)
N[(p – λ )h – c] = τ  ≥  0.
In the event that equation (8) is not binding, τ  = 0 implies that –T(N – 1)c2 = k,
which is a contradiction since c2 > 0. Therefore equation (8) is binding, and the
equilibrium is characterized by the following:
TT T N hQ T c h c k == − = ,, ( ) and Social Optimum. 1 (26)
Notice that the congestion effect (c2 > 0) does not actually play a role in the social
planner’s solution in equation (26). This is in contrast to my specification in inputs
space [see equation (10)], where the congestion effect (f2 < 0) explicitly appears.
Now, consider the ITQ equilibrium. With ITQs, the profit function for an indi-
vidual fisherman is:
π i = T[phi – c(hi, h–i)] – mzi – ki. (27)
The active fisherman chooses hi, zi, and Ti to maximize equation (27) subject to
equations (8) and (12), where the latter is specified in terms of hi, rather than in
terms of an underlying production function. Again, letting λ i and τ i denote the
Lagrange multipliers for these constraints, the necessary conditions include:
λ i =  m,
p – m =  c1, (28)
(p – m)hi – c = τ i ≥   0,
plus the condition that profits equal the return from selling one’s quotas:
T[(p – m)hi – c] =  ki. (29)
Again, by equation (29), it is clear that the season length constraint, equation (8), is
binding for each active fisherman. Thus, the symmetric ITQ equilibrium is given by:
TT T N hQ T h cc k == − () = , , and ITQ Equilibrium. 1 (30)
This demonstrates the point made by Danielsson that ITQs are efficient in the pres-
ence of congestion externalities when the congestion externalities are defined in
terms of the cost function c(hi, h–i), where c1 > 0 and c2 > 0 is assumed. It also shows
that Danielsson’s point does not depend upon the fact that there is only one endog-
enous variable (the harvest level) in his model.
It might be thought that one can simply solve the input model of congestions in
the previous section for the xi as functions of the harvest levels, e.g., xi = g(hi, h–i),
and substitute these into the objective function to obtain a cost function with the
properties that c1 > 0 and c2 > 0. However, while it is apparently possible to solve
for the inputs in terms of the outputs, it does not follow that the derived cost func-
tion would have the properties assumed by Danielsson. If this were true, then the
qualitative properties of the models would be identical. I have shown here that theBoyce 240
qualitative properties are not the same. Therefore, the duality theorems for an indi-
vidual price-taking firm do not aggregate to an entire industry.
Note also that the equilibrium quota price is rather curious: m = λ  + (N – 1)c2 > λ ,
since c2 > 0. This means that the equilibrium price no longer reflects the social value
of an additional harvest quota (recall that λ  is equal to the value of another unit of
quota, already taking account of the congestion externality). This is a strange result,
and it goes without explanation or discussion by Danielsson.
The Efficiency of ITQs When the Congestion Externality is of the Form
ˆ(, ) ch N i
To further emphasize my point that it is inputs that matter for congestion externali-
ties, consider a cost function that has been used by Smith (1968, 1969), Brown
(1974), and Karpoff (1987). Assume that profits to a fisherman are of the following
form (where  ˆ c2 > 0 is the congestion externality):
π ii i i Tp h ch N k =− − [] ˆ(, ) . (31)
The social planner’s problem is to maximize equation (6) with profits now specified
as in equation (31) subject to the constraints in equations (7) and (8). Again, letting
λ  and τ  denote the Lagrange multipliers for these constraints, the necessary condi-
tions include:
pc −= λ ˆ1
Tp h c N c k () ˆˆ −− − [] = λ 2 (32)
Np h c () ˆ . −− [] =≥ λτ 0
As in the previous model, if the season length constraint, equation (8), is not bind-
ing, it implies τ  = 0, but this results in − TNc ˆ2= k, which is a contradiction. Thus, the
social planner’s solution includes:
TT T N fQ T h ccN c k == − − [] = ,, ˆˆ ˆ and Social Optimum. 12 (33)
Under ITQs, fishermen choose hi, zi, and Ti to maximize:
π ii i i i T ph c h N mz k =− [] −− ˆ(, ) . (34)
Subject to the constraints in equations (8) and (12), with the latter appropriately speci-
fied with hi instead of the production function f, the necessary conditions include:
λ i = m,
pmc −=ˆ1 (35)
() ˆ pm h c ii −− = ≥ τ 0
plus the condition that profits equal the return from selling one’s quotas:
Tp m h c k ii () ˆ . −− [] = (36)Comment:  ITQs and Externalities 241
These may be combined to show that the symmetric ITQ equilibrium includes
the following:
TT T N hQ T c h c k == − [] = ,, ˆˆ, and ITQ Equilibrium. 1 (37)
Again, the ITQ equilibrium and the social planner’s conditions do not match. It is
clear from equation (37) that the difference is simply that the individual fisherman
ignores the congestion externality [the  Nc ˆ2 term in the third expression of equation
(33)]. Thus, when the cost function is specified in a manner that is consistent with
the congestion externality as exhibited in equation (1), the result is that ITQs do not
maximize social welfare.
Pecuniary Externalities
I argue that Danielsson has specified his profit function such that it is indistinguishable
from a pecuniary externality. To see this, suppose that instead of a congestion externality
in the form of equation (24), it is assumed that price depends upon the aggregate harvest
rate per unit time; i.e., p =  ph j j
N () , = ∑ 1  where p′  < 0, and that an individual fisherman’s
costs depend only upon that fisherman’s own output; i.e., ci = ch i () , with  ′ c  > 0 and
′′ c  > 0. Thus, there is no congestion externality as specified by Danielsson, but
there is a pecuniary externality. The profit of an individual fisherman is thus:
π ij j
N
ii i Tp h h ch k = () − [] − = ∑ 1 () . (38)
The social planner’s problem is to maximize:
V T p s ds c h k
h

















subject to equations (7) and (8). The maximized values of N, h, T, and λ  satisfy the
following necessary conditions:
pN h c
T p Nh h c k
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In addition, both equations (7) and (8) hold with equality. Thus, the social optimum
includes:
TT T N hQ T c h c k == ′ − [] = ,, , and Social Optimum. (41)
Now, consider the ITQ equilibrium in which each fisherman acts as a price taker in
both the quota and output markets, but chooses his own season length. In this case,
profits are:Boyce 242
π ii j j i i i i i Tp hh ch k m T h q =− [] −− − () ( ) ( ) . Σ 0 (42)
The necessary conditions for an active fisherman (one who does not sell his quotas
and retire) include:
  
pN h m c
N p Nh m h c





− [] − {} =≥
− [] − {} =
0
0 τ ITQ Equilibrium (43)
These, in turn, are identical to equation (40) for m = λ .
Thus, with a pecuniary externality but no congestion externality, ITQs solve the
common property problem. So what? In equation (24), where a congestion external-
ity of the form Danielsson uses has been specified, and equation (42), where there is
no congestion externality but there is a pecuniary externality (and where zi = Thi – q0



















Tp Nh h 2 00 (, ) ( ) . and (44)
Thus, Danielsson’s result is a direct result of the fact that his specification of a
profit function with a congestion externality is indistinguishable in first differences
from that of a profit function with a pecuniary externality. It is, therefore, no sur-
prise that he finds that a single instrument, such as ITQs, is sufficient to overcome
this externality.
Conclusion
There are two ways in which a congestion externality is resolved when ITQs are in-
troduced in a fishery. One is when there is only a single endogenous variable caus-
ing both the common property and congestion externalities. Here, a single instru-
ment is sufficient. The other is when the congestion externality is expressed in the
form of a cost function with ci = c(hi, h–i), as in Danielsson. Danielsson does not re-
view the literature on congestion externalities to see how they have been modeled
by other authors—myself excepted. His externality is certainly not the congestion
externality that has been modeled previously in either the fisheries literature or the
road congestion literature. Nor does Danielsson attempt to justify his assumptions or
to draw out the economic nature of the difference between his model and the model
considered by others and myself. Indeed, he does not show the underlying produc-
tion relationship that his cost function implies.
Danielsson claims that the congestion externality is due to outputs—so fisher-
man i’s costs rise as the output of other fishermen increases. The externality due to
outputs with price taking firms is a pecuniary externality, not a congestion external-
ity. True, profits to fishermen i decrease as other fishermen’s aggregate output in-
creases when there exists a pecuniary externality, but this is not an externality that
economists think requires fixing. Indeed, it is difficult to conceptualize the eco-Comment:  ITQs and Externalities 243
nomic nature of the externality in Danielsson’s model. Congestion on a roadway is
caused by the number (or types) of cars using it—an input measure—not by the
speed of the cars—the output measure. In Danielsson’s specification, it is more
costly to drive fast when other drivers are going fast. It seems much more likely that
it is more costly to drive fast when other drivers are going slowly. Similarly, conges-
tion in a fishery is due to inputs, not outputs. A fisherman catches fewer fish be-
cause he has to elbow his way through all of the other fishermen to get a chance to
fish—not because the other fishermen are catching all the fish.
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